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The Future of Differentiated Integration in Europe:   
 
A Soft Core Europe of Multi-Clustered Member-States in Overlapping Policy 
Communities 
 
Vivien Schmidt, Boston University 
 
 
The future of Europe will be one of differentiated integration.  The question is not 
whether but how that differentiation will develop.  EU leaders themselves have 
increasingly acknowledged this, including in the ‘Rome declaration’ of March 25, 2017, 
in which they stated that: “We will act together, at different paces and intensity where 
necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with 
the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later.”1  And the 
European Commission, in the White Paper on the Future of Europe published earlier that 
same month, on March 1, 2017, elaborated a scenario made up of ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ that would carry forward new cooperation projects in areas such as defense and 
security, justice, taxation and social policy, with other Member States able to join those 
projects at a later stage, once ready or willing.2 
 
Many possible differentiated futures have been evoked over the years, including a multi-
speed Europe, a hard-core Europe around the Eurozone, a Europe of variable geometry, 
and more.  This paper takes a middle way through these views, arguing that the future is 
likely to consist of a soft-core Europe made up of the multiple clusters of member-states 
that overlap in their participation in the EU’s many policy communities.   
 
Rather than a small hard core of member-states engaged together in deepening across 
policy areas, then, or all member-states moving forward together in lockstep, I see a soft 
core of member-states united by their participation in many if not most policy 
communities—but not all necessarily in the same exact set of sectors.  The EU now has 







optimal agreements on deeper integration, in particular given EU unanimity rules for 
treaties.  Although many such divergences may have long existed, the problems have 
become more acute as a result of the concatenating crises in key areas such as money 
(eurocrisis), borders (immigration and refugee crisis), security (terrorism and the 
neighborhood), and the continuing integrity of the EU itself (Brexit).  In conjunction with 
these crises has come an over-arching political crisis.  It results from the failures to 
resolve the EU’s multiple crises, and manifests itself in the increasing politicization of the 
very idea of European integration, along with growing questions about European 
democracy and legitimacy, as national electorates turn increasingly to populist parties to 
protest perceived failures of EU and national policies, politics, and economics. All of this 
together challenges the gains of European integration, and could even threaten to bring 
disintegration.   
 
EU integration itself has long been a process in which groups of member-states have 
sometimes advanced on their own in one or another area outside the treaties (e.g., 
Schengen), with others joining later as a new policy community is incorporated into the 
EU.  Some differences may just be a matter of time or timing.  Others may be 
fundamental, involving differences in philosophies or identities that will take a long time 
to reconcile, if ever.  But in the interim, the question to be answered is whether and/or 
how member-states can stay together even as some may go further more quickly than 
others in ways that result in optimal solutions.  And for this, we need to consider not only 
the possibilities for differentiated integration in key policy areas but also the institutional 
consequences of such arrangements, to ensure that they would work in any given policy 
area without undermining the common institutions so necessary to continued EU 
integration, let alone to the continuing goals of European democracy and legitimacy. 
 
In what follows, I begin with a brief discussion of the EU’s many crises, followed by a 
discussion of EU governance an increasingly politicized Europe.  With all these issues in 
mind, I then examine current forms of differentiated integration, and subsequently 
propose ways for the EU to move forward through greater differentiated integration.   
 
I argue that we need to rethink what the EU is:  not a future federal-state, not a 
confederation, nor the ‘end of Europe,’ but already a supranational ‘region-state’ 
characterized by differentiated integration because made up of overlapping policy 
communities with different clusters of member-states engaged in various forms of 
reinforced cooperation.  In consequence, rather than envisioning a future hard core 
around the Eurozone, I see the future as consisting of a soft core made up of the large 
majority of member-states whose participation in EU policy communities overlaps, even 
if they don’t all belong to the same range of communities.  As for the EU’s many policy 
areas, while some, such as security and defense policy, immigration and refugee policy, 
	 3	
and even the Single Market arguably require more differentiated integration, the 
Eurozone demands greater deconcentration and decentralization, to give back to the 
member-states control over their economic policies, so as to reinvigorate national politics 
while dampening populism.   
 
Crisis Challenges to EU Integration 
 
The European Union has been in the midst of a cascading series of crises over the past 
decade, including the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, not to mention the 
ups and downs of the security crisis every time a terrorist attack hits, the divisive 
concerns over immigration, and more.  Each of these crises potentially represents an 
existential challenge for the EU.   All demand concerted EU responses, meaning some 
form of greater coordination and, in consequence, deeper EU integration.  But only in one 
case, the Eurozone crisis, has deeper integration been successfully pursued, and it has not 
been a great success. 
 
Although the euro was indeed saved, the Eurozone lives with the lingering threat of 
deflation, low growth, rising poverty, and high unemployment, particularly in Southern 
Europe.  Much of this can be attributed to the suboptimal policies linked to deeper 
integration through the austerity and structural reforms of ‘governing by rules and ruling 
by numbers’ in the Eurozone.3 In response to the crisis, rather than providing some form 
of debt forgiveness or debt mutualization accompanied by greater investment stimulus, 
the EU reinforced macroeconomic austerity rules mandating low inflation, low deficits, 
and low debt while agreeing to greater oversight over member-state governments’ 
budgets.4   
 
In the refugee crisis, the EU response has, in contrast with the Eurozone, involved a lack 
of coordination accompanied by increasing fragmentation.  Member-states have divided 
over what to do and how, retreating even from the integration already in place, both in 
terms of Schengen’s borderless Europe and the rules governing asylum seekers.   
 
In the security crisis, moreover, the failure to move toward any significant integration 
continues to plague the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)—and this 
despite the rising risks of terrorism coming from the Middle East and the continued threat 
from Russia linked to the frozen conflict in the Ukraine.   The election of Donald Trump 
to the US presidency only intensifies the security crises, in particular given  
																																																								
3 Schmidt 2015a, 2016 
4 Blyth 2013 
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Trump’s pre-election statements supporting Russian President Putin and questioning the 
value of continuing with NATO, and the more recent discursive skirmishes with the 
North Korean leader.   
 
Brexit represents its own special challenge.  Here, the uncertainty of how and what the 
UK will negotiate in terms of its future relationship with the EU opens up a whole range 
of questions not only about the future of the UK but also of the EU. The negotiation 
process itself risks splitting the member-states with regard to the terms of Brexit, in 
particular given all the other crises that have made EU governance increasingly 
gridlocked.  Moreover, the loss of the UK—if it comes to that—while perhaps facilitating 
agreements among the remaining 27, at the same time weakens the EU economically as 
well militarily, unless some form of positively differentiated integration is negotiated.  
But even more importantly, and regardless of the outcome, British exit of from the EU in 
any form challenges the very idea of European integration, and raises the specter of EU 
disintegration. 
 
These crises not only pose major policy challenges for the EU, whether with regard to 
promoting economic prosperity, guaranteeing the borders, ensuring security, or 
negotiating Brexit.  They also represent significant political challenges, with spillover 
effects on national democracy and legitimacy.  
 
Together, the policy crises embody a cross cutting political crisis regarding the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy.  As authority and control have moved up to the EU level in order 
to solve common problems, national democracy has been increasingly emptied of 
substance in EU dominated policy areas, in particular as EU level technocratic decisions 
are perceived to have substituted for the national level politics of left and right.5 All 
member-states as a result struggle with an upsurge of populism, as the political extremes 
have made the EU a prime target because of concerns about national identity and 
sovereignty focused on the impact of the euro and fears of immigration mingled with 
worries about terrorists.  The simple fact of Brexit only further intensified the populist 
pressures by energizing European extremist parties with calls for withdrawal from the EU, 
or at least the euro, as well as an end to open borders (Schengen) and restrictions on 
immigration and citizenship.  Finally, even though most populist parties moderated their 
rhetoric with regard to exit from the euro subsequent to Macron’s election defeat of 
Marine Le Pen, that defeat may only be momentary, unless the EU manages at least to 
begin to respond to the crisis challenges with new, more successful policies as well as 




5 Schmidt 2006 
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EU Governance Challenges to Integration 
 
The failure to resolve the EU’s multiple crises points to deeper problems of EU 
governance.  These are embedded in the very architecture of the EU, in the ways in which 
the different modes of EU governance have evolved and in how EU actors have engaged 
with one another over time.  Understanding how EU governance has affected crisis 
resolution is therefore arguably a first step to thinking about how to resolve the current 
crises.  But sorting out the exact linkages between EU governance and the failure to solve 
the crises is not easy.  This is because analysts have long disagreed over which EU 
governance processes predominate and who is in control of those processes.  Traditional 
conceptions of EU actors as focused on power and interests confront new views centered 
on consensus-seeking deliberation.  On-going convictions that member-state political 
leaders are in charge through their intergovernmental negotiations in the Council clash 
with alternative certainties that technical actors are in control via their activities in 
supranational EU administrative and regulatory bodies. And both may be contradicted by 
views that hold that the European Parliament can no longer be ignored because it has 
increasingly become a force to be reckoned with in the name of democratic legitimacy.6 
 
The EU’s Three Dominant Modes of Governance:  Old and New Views 
The decision-making processes of the European Union have long been dominated by 
three modes of governance: intergovernmental decision-making, in which the member-
states in the Council decide, usually under unanimity rules through treaties and 
agreements; supranational decision-making, in which EU institutional actors like the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice interpret and apply EU decisions; and co-
decision-making, in which the European Parliament (EP) is an equal with the Council in 
the legislative process, following Commission initiatives on legislation.  Each of these 
decision-making modes has its problems. The Council’s intergovernmentalism suffers 
from the unanimity rule for treaties, which makes consensus difficult to forge, lowest 
common denominator agreements most likely where the issues are most challenging, and 
altering existing treaties extremely difficult. The Commission and other supranational 
actors are hemmed in by the often sub-optimal treaties and rules agreed by the Council, 
with insufficient flexibility or discretion to take the steps needed to make the policies 
work as they should.  The EP lacks institutional power to balance out the other 
institutions as well as adequate representativeness to be fully politically legitimate. 
 
EU actors and analysts have long disagreed over which of these modes of governance—
and as a corollary to this which EU institutional actor—is and has been most important to 
the development of the EU.  But they also divide over what motivates EU actors and/or 
what defines their decision-making.  
																																																								
6 See Schmidt 2018 for a more extensive discussion of what follows 
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Initially, the main divide was between analysts convinced that intergovernmental 
decision-making in the Council was central to European integration versus those more 
convinced of the importance of supranational decision making by the Commission. Both 
sides, however, portrayed EU actors in rationalist terms, as primarily focused on 
enhancing their own power and interests in efforts to gain or maintain control of the EU 
integration process. Traditional intergovernmentalists took either a ‘realist’ view in which 
member states’ bargaining was focused on protecting national sovereignty and interests7 
while building Europe or a ‘liberal’ view in which member states’ bargaining served as a 
conduit for domestic socio-economic interests.8  Traditional supranationalists instead 
defined integration either as the product of neo-functionalist processes of ‘spillover’ from 
one policy area to the next or as the result of bureaucratic entrepreneurialism and 
institutional creep, which increasingly empowered supranational technical actors such as 
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (CJEU).9 
 
More recently, although intergovernmentalists and supranationalists both continue to 
disagree over which EU actors are the drivers of integration, many on both sides have 
developed new approaches to the explanation of EU governance, in which they see EU 
actors’ interactions as more about seeking compromise and consensus through discursive 
processes of deliberation and persuasion focused on their ideas, rather than about power 
and material interests alone.  
 
Thus, against traditional intergovernmentalists focused on power politics, the ‘new’ 
intergovernmentalists maintain that the decision-making process in the Council since the 
Maastricht Treaty of the early 1990s needs to be understood in terms of member state 
governments seeking to arrive at consensual agreements through deliberation in 
negotiations that lead to agreements resulting from processes of persuasion.10  And 
against the traditional supranationalists, they contend that member states’ new 
intergovernmental activism in the Council has supplanted traditional supranationalism, 
because the Council deliberately created de novo EU bodies and instruments outside the 
purview of the Commission, such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), in efforts to maintain and/or regain control over EU 
integration.11 
 
The ‘new’ supranationalists take a different view of EU governance.  Although they 
might agree that technical actors no longer seek control through deeper integration, they 
																																																								
7 Hoffmann 1966 
8 Moravcsik 1993; see also Schimmelfennig 2015 
9 Sandholtz and Stone Sweet1998; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 2001; Ioannou et al. 2015 
10 Puetter 2014  
11  Bickerton et al. 2015 
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contend that technical actors—whether long-standing or de novo bodies—have gained 
even greater powers of enforcement than in the past, and this through the very rules 
passed by the more active (new) intergovernmental political leaders. In an ironic twist, 
these new supranationalists find in addition that it is the technical actors themselves who 
developed the policy ideas which they then persuaded intergovernmental political leaders 
to pass, which effectively increased such technical actors’ institutional powers of 
enforcement. 12 
 
What both intergovernmentalists and supranationalists largely leave out is the European 
Parliament (EP), which they see as having diminished influence.  But here too, we find 
not only traditional parliamentarist arguments for the continuing importance of the 
community method in formal decision-making, showing that the EP’s legislative powers 
of co-decision have enabled it to come in earlier and earlier in attempts to influence the 
Commission on policy, with the credible threat that if it is not informed of the process, it 
can veto the initiative or slow the process. We also find ‘new’ parliamentarist view of the 
EP’s increasing importance based in more informal ways of exercising influence, whether 
as the ‘go-to’ body for other EU actors concerned about their political legitimacy or as an 
oversight body demanding greater procedural accountability and transparency from 
intergovernmental and supranational actors.13  
 
So who is right in these many sided debates about who is in charge or in control of EU 
governance?    It is hard to choose a side because the actors themselves are in constant 
interaction, whether it is supranational actors persuading intergovernmental actors to take 
action, intergovernmental actors threatening supranational ones in order to constrain their 
action, or parliamentary actors pushing to play a role.  It is not just that the Commission 
or the ECB may supply the ideas that the Council then decides upon, which may result in 
greater enhancement of supranational actors’ ability to act autonomously or with 
discretionary authority.14  It is also that the member-states—inside or outside the 
Council—may raise political objections or threaten legal action in order to constrain such 
actors’ autonomous or discretionary action. And supranational actors are therefore careful 
to consider how the intergovernmental actors might respond to their initiatives, 
anticipating possible objections and/or consulting prior to action in order to gain 
preliminary agreement.  Moreover, both intergovernmental and supranational actors are 
increasingly aware of the EP, with its growing demands for attention on legitimacy 
grounds.   
 
The Politicized Dynamics of EU Governance 
																																																								
12 Dehousse 2016; Bauer and Becker 2014; Epstein and Rhodes 2016 
13 Héritier et al., 2016  
14 Bauer and Becker 2014; Dehousse 2016 
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The one major omission in all such approaches to EU governance is any 
acknowledgement of the increasing politicization of all of these dynamics of interaction 
among EU actors.  Politicization, moreover, comes in three different forms.  It involves 
not only the politicization at the top, among EU institutional actors battling internally as 
well as with one another over agendas based on different ideas and interests.  It equally 
involves politicization at the bottom, within the member-states as a result the rise of 
Euroskepticism in its many forms along with the rise of populism.  And this brings with it 
politicization from the bottom to the top, as national level politicization infuses the EU 
level, whether directly via the electoral concerns of member-state political leaders in the 
Council or more indirectly as EU technical actors in supranational institutions worry 
about how to respond to the political pressures through better procedures and 
performance. 
 
‘Post-functionalist’ theories help fill in some of this picture of the new political dynamics 
of EU (differentiated) integration.  These emphasize the increasing importance of 
crosscutting cleavages at the national level between traditional political divisions based 
on adherence to right/left political parties and newer identity-related divisions based on 
xenophobic/authoritarian versus cosmopolitan/liberal values.15  Post-functionalism, then, 
is all about the issues related to national level politicization.  The main link between the 
results of post-functionalist work and EU integration theory has come from scholars 
concerned about whether politicization is a good thing or a bad thing for EU governance 
in general and/or for intergovernmental, supranational, or parliamentary actors in 
particular.  For the most part, the divide has been between scholars concerned mainly 
with political legitimacy, who have argued that politicization is a good thing, necessary 
for European integration to be accepted by national publics,16 and those centered on 
performance legitimacy, who have seen it as a bad thing,17 making it increasingly 
difficult for the EU to produce effective policies because of conflicting preferences, or 
even to agree on the benefits of the outcomes.18   
 
For the post-functionalists, politicization is not necessarily a good thing or a bad thing 
because, like it or not, it is a ‘thing,’ and here to stay.19  By now, and in particular since 
the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, no one can dispute this.  But it only 
further complicates EU decision-making, in particular in the Council, as member-state 
leaders bring national political concerns to the table, whether these involve domestic 
electoral interests or identity-related ideas. 
 
																																																								
15 Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi et al. 2008 
16  E.g., Follesdal 2006; Zürn 2006; Hix and Hoyland 2015 
17  Moravcsik 2002 
18  Scharpf 200x? 
19  Kriesi 2016; De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2009 
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The politicization of EU governance at the top raises questions about all approaches to 
EU governance discussed above, old and new.  It suggests that Council bargaining and 
deliberation now may produce decisions that depend more on EU member-state leaders’ 
perceptions of domestic politics than on their (realist) beliefs about national interest or 
their (liberal intergovernmental) responses to domestic socio-economic interests.  Such 
politicization has not only affected intra-Council relations, making solving the EU’s 
multiple crises more difficult.  It has equally infected Council interactions with EU 
technical officials in EU administrative and regulatory agencies.  The Commission in 
particular has increasingly been subject to political scrutiny for its discretionary decisions, 
which are increasingly interpreted as political rather than purely technical.  This helps 
explain why the Commission usually makes a point of insisting on the technical validity 
and performance legitimacy of its policies and the procedural legitimacy of its 
policymaking processes—except, of course, when the Commission President quips, when 
asked about making exceptions to the rules for France, that it is:  ‘Because it is France.’20 
This, naturally, led to accusations by Northern European finance ministers in the 
Eurogroup and conservative politicians in the Council that the Commission President was 
playing politics, with political discretion exercised in the context of budgetary oversight 
for Southern European countries as well as France.21  More generally, however, the 
discretionary decisions also point to the fact that EU technical officials are clearly aware 
of the political implications of their decisions, and therefore seek to address political 
legitimacy concerns along with their focus on good policy performance and high 
procedural quality.  As for the EP, the current situation, in which a politically centrist 
mainstream coalition focuses on the public interest, may be difficult to sustain were the 
2019 parliamentary elections to bring in more populists—which to date have largely been 
marginalized despite their 20% representation.   
 
 
The Current State of EU Differentiation 
 
The complicated political dynamics of current EU governance helps explain why the EU 
is already in a state of differentiated integration.  That differentiation can be seen not only 
in the member-states’ differential participation in the EU’s many policy communities but 
also in the increasing differentiation within and across the member-states.  As Stefano 
Bartolini has argued, European integration has led to a ‘process of nation state boundary 
transcendence, resulting in a process of de-differentiation of European polities’ after a 
history of five centuries of progressive differentiation into nation states.22 This goes all 
																																																								
20 Reuters, May 31, 2016  http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-deficit-france/eu-gives-budget-leeway-to-
france-because-it-is-france-juncker-idUKKCN0YM1N0  
21 Der Spiegel online, June 17, 2016 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-commission-president-
juncker-under-fire-a-1098232.html  
22 Bartolini 2005 
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the way from competition policy and state aid to the very boundaries of the welfare state, 
as Maurizio Ferrera has shown, despite the clear lack of EU jurisdiction in this area.23  
 
The fruits of nation-state boundary transcendence could arguably also be seen lately in 
the rise of sub-national regional movements for independence, encouraged to go it alone 
in the European Union by their state’s loss of control over many state-defining areas in 
the belief that they would do better apart—as a ‘nation’ as well as a state.  This has been 
most notable in the cases of Scotland—where Brexit represents a major challenge for a 
‘nation’ that voted in favour of staying in the EU—and Catalonia—in particular with the 
Catalan referendum on independence representing yet another unresolved crisis for the 
EU.  But even without such movements, a process of ‘re-scaling’ has been in progress in 
which the regions have become spaces for the further differentiation of the nation-state 
‘from below,’ by constituting a new meso-level of policymaking, political activity, and 
cultural expression that makes for increasing diversity within as well as between the 
member-states.24  Across the member-states, then, de-differentiation results from 
pressures from above, at the EU level, and from below, at the regional. 
 
Differentiated Integration in EU Policy Areas 
All of this makes for a EU that is itself highly differentiated internally—which is only 
further complicated by the fact that the EU’s integration remain variable not just in terms 
of geographical borders but also in terms of participation in different policy sectors. Not 
only do we not know where the EU’s finalité will be – will it stop at the Balkans, the 
Ukraine, Georgia, not to mention Turkey?  In terms of policy as well, the EU’s policies 
other than those related to the Single Market also have highly variable geometry – 
whether Schengen borders (minus the UK and Ireland but with Norway, Iceland, and 
Switzerland), Common Security and Defense Policy (without Denmark but with the 
participation of Norway in the Nordic Battlegroup and with all members being able to opt 
in or out), the Charter of Fundamental Rights (with opt-outs for the UK and Poland), 
even freedom of movement of workers, which excluded Romania and Bulgaria until 2014 
(and for which the UK demanded an extension).  And of course there is the Single 
Currency, which includes 19 out of 27 member-states, the rest of which have either 
permanent opt-outs (UK and DK), are resistant but without opt-out (Sweden), or are 
eager but not yet ready to opt in (the other CEECs).  Additionally, the second Greek crisis 
for the Eurozone, in 2015, renewed discussion of the possibility that member-states that 
signed up to EMU could exit or, as Fritz Scharpf argues, be part of a second level 
currency.25  Moreover, Brexit adds yet another level of complexity to the EU, depending 
upon how and in which areas its involvement with the EU is renegotiated. 
																																																								
23 Ferrera  2005 
24  Keating 2013 
25  Scharpf this volume 
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Even in the Single Market, integration is differentiated through negotiated opt-outs for 
individual countries, by providing for special exemptions to commonly agreed rules. 
‘Informal governance,’ as Marieke Kleine explains, has been normal part of a process of 
negotiated agreement in the Single Market since the very beginning.  Its purpose has been 
to reinforce the legitimacy of the formal governance processes in cases where the 
political fallout from domestic groups’ objections could jeopardize consensual EU level 
politics or national political stability.26  In Eurozone crisis governance, in contrast, the 
Commission could be seen as having created exceptional rules ‘by stealth’ in the period 
between 2011 and 2015, in order to enable non-program countries to bolster their 
economic performance while shoring up their political legitimacy against populist 
challenges.27 
 
Such country-based policy-related variability is likely only to increase over time given 
the possibilities for even more differentiation allowed by the Lisbon Treaty through 
‘permanent structured cooperation’ in the defense and security policy arena and 
‘enhanced cooperation’ in all others.  ‘Permanent structured cooperation’ permits the 
greatest variability, since it enables any number of EU member-states to agree to deeper 
integration of their military capabilities and engage in joint military operations subject, of 
course, to their obligations under the various EU and NATO Treaties.  It was also 
intended to enable member-states to create coalitions of any size under the umbrella of 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).28  What we see currently is a proliferation 
of differentiation.  The very recent initiative focused on PESCO, expected to deepen 
security integration with a large number of member-states, comes alongside other 
initiatives, including the ‘Framework Nation Concept’ and the ‘European Intervention 
Initiative.’29  As such, it suggests that differentiated integration in this policy arena may 
take a number of different forms. 
 
‘Enhanced cooperation’ has also begun to work, despite the fact that it requires at least 
nine participant member-states, with authorization by the Council to be ‘a last resort’ 
decision when the Union as a whole cannot attain those same objectives within a 
reasonable period (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007/C 306/22/2). Enhanced cooperation has 
already been deployed in the areas of divorce of cross-border couples and patents.   It is 
additionally in process with regard to the harmonization of one kind of fiscal policy—the 
financial transaction tax.  The fact that enhanced cooperation was even agreed in the 
Lisbon Treaty also signals member-states’ acknowledgement that a high degree of 
differentiation without integration—even fragmentation—remains the norm in a wide 
																																																								
26 Kleine 2013 
27  Schmidt 2016 
28  Howorth 2014 
29  Howorth this volume 
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range of policy areas.  Although monetary policy and the rules of fiscal discipline 
represent areas of increased convergence, defense and security is not the only area 
characterized by continued divergence.  Transport, communications, and infrastructure 
have also seen minimal integration or forward movement.  Worse yet, however, are areas 
such as energy and the environment as well as migration, mobility, and asylum, which 
are subject to fragmentation and the risk of disintegration.30  The problem here is that 
continued differentiation without integration also undermines EU capacity to deal with 
challenges that the member-states themselves cannot solve on their own. 
 
Differentiated Integration in EU Membership 
Differentiated integration is also increased by the presence in the EU’s region-state of 
‘outside insiders’ like Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland that participate in the Single 
Market as well as in a range of other EU policy communities such as Schengen and 
CSDP but don’t have a vote.  It is complicated by initiatives like the Bologna process for 
higher education harmonization, which was set up outside the EU by EU member states, 
includes most member states (but again not the UK) as well as many non-EU states 
across Europe, and was aided financially and administratively by the Commission.31  
Differentiated integration was only further extended by the Eastern Partnerships and 
other ‘Neighborhood’ policies which by now involve deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreements, gradual integration into the EU economy, ‘mobility and security pacts,’ and 
the promotion of democracy and good governance.   
 
The question of membership for countries on the periphery remains of special concern, in 
particular given the increasing geo-political tensions.  One possibility would be to think 
of this in terms of ‘graduated’ membership, with membership no longer just a long term 
matter of ‘in’ or ‘out’ but also a shorter term question of ‘in which areas’ or ‘out of which 
areas,’ once certain basic requirements are fulfilled, including the establishment of 
democratic practices, respect for human rights, and a commitment to free markets.  
Graduated membership could be a spur to countries on the EU’s borders to continue to 
liberalize and democratize, thus enabling the EU to maintain its ‘power of attraction,’32 
which could be lost if it fixed its borders at any given point.33   
 
Graduated membership could also operate in the other direction, of course.  In the case of 
Brexit, it could be a way for the UK to continue to engage with the EU while being 
largely out of most policy areas while still in the Single Market or customs union in some 
form, as well as in Security and Defense.  The question for the UK is whether it will 
remain on the outside, with multiple opt-ins, or on the inside with even more opt-outs.  
																																																								
30  Tocci 2014 
31 Ravinet 2008 
32 Leonard, 2005 
33  Schmidt 2009 
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Much depends not only on the progress of the UK’s negotiations but also on how the EU 
reforms itself to allow for further differentiated integration—not just for the UK but for 
all the member-states in the context of gridlock in a range of areas, including on the hot-
button issue of immigration and refugee policy. 
 
But such graduated membership would only be attractive to prospective members, as well 
as to outside insiders, if it were to come with institutional voice and vote in the sectors in 
which they participate.  This inverts Prodi’s promise to the neighbors of ‘everything but 
institutions,’ since the institutions need to come with policy participation.  Otherwise, for 
countries in the EU’s periphery, why try to meet the criteria demanding significant 
democracy and market opening when neighborhood policy allows entry into the 
European market with criteria that are more exhortatory than real with regard to 
democratization? And for countries like Norway, Iceland, or Switzerland that already 
participate in the Single Market in myriad ways, without vote, or the UK, which is 
currently negotiating a reduction in its involvement in order to ‘take back control,’ what 
is the value-added of graduated membership if they do not have a voice and a vote in the 
areas in which they participate?34  
 
That said, for a number of countries in the EU’s neighborhood, graduated membership 
with an option to join in the medium term is no longer as feasible as it may have appeared 
only a few years ago, given a range of new considerations that arguably rule out anything 
more than a ‘privileged partnership.’  In the cases of the Ukraine and Georgia, 
geopolitical considerations involving Russia are the main obstacle.  For a country like 
Turkey, its slide backwards—in terms both of democratic norms and its general 
slowdown in closing chapters in the accession process—suggests that it may continue to 
remain in limbo.  This suggests that in addition to active graduated memberships, there 
may be ones that remain frozen, at least for the foreseeable future. 
 
In short, membership in the EU could also be further differentiated. Beyond the basic 
membership requirements of democracy, respect for human rights, and participation in 
the Single Market, member-states have already come to cluster in different groupings, by 
picking and choosing the policy ‘communities’ in which they wish to participate. In this 
context, with all these different forms of policy communities with full and potentially 
‘graduated’ membership, one might ask how would the EU hold together and how can it 
govern?  And what of democratic legitimacy, in particular given the multi-level 
politicization of governance, and the centrifugal populist forces at play? 
   
 
What Future for the New EU Governance? 
																																																								
34  Schmidt 2009 
	 14	
 
Before answering the question of how to go forward, we first need to rethink how the EU 
works as a whole, along with its finalité, that is, where it is going.  The EU was never 
going to become the federal superstate that the British in particular have feared or the 
United States of Europe that European federalists have long envisioned.  But is it going to 
become a two-speed Europe?35 A Europe of concentric circles surrounding a compact 
core?36  A Europe with a hard core centered around the Eurozone?  Or, failing these, a 
Europe completely à la carte?   
 
I prefer to think of the EU as a ‘region-state,’ that is, a supranational union of nation-
states, in which the creative tension between the supranational Union and its member-
states ensures both ever-increasing regional integration and ever-continuing national 
differentiation.37  And in this region-state, we do better to think about the EU’s future 
organization in terms of a soft core Europe, made up of overlapping clusters of European 
countries participating in the EU’s many different policy communities, all administered 
by a single set of EU institutions, and in which most member-states will be involved in 
most areas (beyond the Single Market, to which all belong by definition), even if some, 
like the UK, will have more limited involvement.   
 
Toward a Soft Core Europe 
The problem with a two-speed Europe is that it doesn’t reflect the realities of what is 
already a multi-speed Europe, with different member-states participating in different 
policy communities.  While all member-states are part of the Single Market, membership 
in other policy areas is variable, with many countries in, others out of the Eurozone, 
Schengen, Common Security and Defense Policy, and so on.   For the UK, if we continue 
to think about the EU as at two speeds, the question is whether the UK would be at the 
outer limits of the second speed, in a third speed all its own, with many more opt-outs—
or outside with occasional opt-ins.   
 
The problem with a hard core Europe, especially one in which the Eurozone sits at the 
core, is that it assumes that France and Germany agree on policy.  They do not, in 
particular in the Eurozone, where Germany stands for restrictive budgetary policy to 
																																																								
35 Piris 2012 
36	E.g.,	the	Glenicker group (2013), the Eiffel group (2014), and the Future of Europe 
initiative (2012) all promoted a ‘core Europe’ centered on membership in the Eurozone—
in which a ‘federal’ core could be more or less compact (e.g., founding members of the 
EU plus Spain and Poland, or all Eurozone members)—would be surrounded by a larger 
circle around it constituted by a looser group of members united by the Single Market.	
37 Schmidt 2004, 2006, 2015b 
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maintain stability, France for more expansionary policy to promote growth.38  Were such 
a hard core to be established, it would most likely be dominated by Germany.  Moreover, 
there is little certainty that a smaller hard core around Germany and France would be able 
to come to agreement more readily than the larger EU membership, in particular if the 
unanimity rule were maintained.  Furthermore, why assume that a cluster of member-
states that takes the lead in one policy area (i.e., the Eurozone) would have the ability, let 
alone the will or imagination, to lead in the others (e.g., in security or immigration)?  In 
fact, deeper integration in one area could instead produce an even higher degree of 
differentiation without integration in other policy areas.39  What is more, it would fully 
alienate the post-Brexit UK, and most likely preclude British engagement with the EU 
beyond a minimal involvement with the Single Market.   The British might very well ask, 
‘why deal with the EU at all?’ if the Eurozone were to become the central focus of EU 
integration as a whole, with a hard core of member-states led by Germany and France, 
where insiders with dedicated institutions then set the trajectory for the remaining 
outsiders. 
 
However, the EU could retain its appeal—for the UK as well as other member-states 
resisting membership in the Euro, such as Sweden, or on the outside looking in, such as 
Norway and Switzerland—if the Eurozone were to be seen as just one of the EU’s many 
policy ‘communities’, and the EU itself seen as consisting of a soft core of overlapping 
clusters of member-states in which any duo or trio of member-states would take 
leadership.  With this in mind, while the UK may continue to stand aside with regard to 
the Eurozone, it could decide that it should reclaim a leadership role in Common Security 
and Defense Policy, as one of two European nuclear powers.  As for immigration policy, 
given the problems of reaching a common policy in the context of the refugee crisis and 
mounting disagreements over immigration more generally, this might be an area where 
even more differentiated integration would be seen as appropriate.  What about having 
different ‘immigration zones’ setting common standards, which group together countries 
with similar immigration needs or concerns, for example, the CEECs, the Mediterranean 
countries, and Continental Europe.  As for the Single market and concerns about the 
impact of further deregulation on the welfare state, what about the creation of ‘pools’ for 
health care provision among countries sharing borders.40 
 
Seeing the future of EU integration as a differentiated process of member-state 
participation in different policy communities beyond the Single Market would also allow 
for each such community to further deepen by constituting its own special system of 
																																																								
38 See for example a recent study on the diverging views of French and German MPs on Eurozone 
governance by Blesse et al. 2016  
39 Tocci 2014  
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governance.  In two of the three crisis policy areas, immigration and security, the EU has 
so far done very little of the institution building and law-making required for deeper 
integration.   
 
Rethinking Eurozone Governance from the bottom up 
The Eurozone is different, since it has already deepened its integration, with dedicated 
oversight processes such as the European Semester, with dedicated institutions such as 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and Banking Union, and even more envisioned, 
such as a European Treasury, a Finance Minister, and more.  Such deepening, when 
viewed not as at the center of a hard-core Europe but the first of the developing policy 
communities of a soft core Europe, could be seen as a template for the future of EU 
governance.   
 
But there is one caveat.  What the Eurozone needs, rather than centralized governance by 
restrictive rules and sanction-triggering numbers, is to coordinate macroeconomic 
governance while decentralizing microeconomic governance to the benefit of national 
capitals.  The Eurozone already has an amazing architecture of economic coordination, 
reaching into all the Eurozone ministries of finance and country economic experts.  Why 
not use that coordination to ensure that countries themselves determine what works for 
their very specific economic growth models and varieties of capitalism?  And to have the 
new ‘competitiveness councils’ or the existing fiscal councils act more as industrial 
policy councils rather than structural adjustment hawks?  Moreover, why not use the 
Maastricht criteria as general guidelines for variable yearly targets, depending upon the 
Eurozone’s employment as well as inflation prospects? And rather than demanding that 
all member-states meet the same yearly targets (e.g., of deficit and debt), why not set 
differential country-specific targets (depending upon where the member-states are in their 
economic cycle, and whether they are over-heating and therefore need to contract, or are 
contracting and need to expand)?  Such decisions on the yearly budgetary cycle could be 
debated with the other member-states in the Euro-group as well as the Commission, the 
EP, and the Council to enhance legitimacy.41  All of this together would make Eurozone 
governance more democratically legitimate, especially if national parliaments were 
brought in both nationally and at the EU level, via consultation with the EP.  
 
Such a bottom-up approach is likely not only to promote better economic performance 
but also much more political legitimacy at the national level.  This is because it would put 
responsibility for the country’s economics back in national governments’ hands.  And 
this in turn could help counter the populist drift in many countries, as political parties of 
the mainstream right and left could begin again to differentiate their policies from one 
another, with proposals for different pathways to economic health and the public good.   
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None of this will work, however, if member-states continue to have to contend with 
excessive debt loads that weigh on their economies (e.g., Greece and Italy), if they are 
left without significant investment funds provided by banks or the state (e.g., Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, and even France), as well as if some countries continue to have massive 
surpluses while failing to invest sufficiently (i.e., Germany and other smaller Northern 
European countries).   Some extra form of solidarity is necessary, beyond the European 
Stability Mechanism, such as Eurobonds, Europe-wide unemployment insurance, EU 
investment resources that dwarf the Juncker Plan, or other mechanisms.  Failing this, at 
the very least member-states should be allowed to invest their own resources in things 
like infrastructure, education and training, incurring long-term debt at low interest rates, 
even if this does not fit the current deficit and debt rules. 
 
More Solidarity Mechanisms Across Crisis Areas and More Resources 
The other crisis areas need more, rather than less, integration, and they also require 
solidarity mechanisms.  For the Eurozone crisis, many have already proposed some sort 
of unemployment fund, for all countries to pay into, to use when their unemployment 
goes above a certain threshold.  But there also should be an intra-European ‘EU mobility 
adjustment fund’ to support the extra costs for social services and the retraining needs of 
workers in countries with greater than usual EU migrant worker inflows which may 
constitute an excessive burden to the welfare state.  This could have worked for the UK, 
with a mobility fund addressing the Brexiteers’ fears about the impact of EU freedom of 
movement on the National Health Service (esp. because the government, in trying to 
access the funds, would most likely have to admit that there was little or no excess cost).  
But even more significantly, it could benefit other member-states with other kinds of out-
migration as opposed to in-migration concerns.  Such a fund, for example, could 
compensate Greece for the costs of educating the 2000 medical doctors who have gone to 
practice in Germany, or Austria, which has not been allowed to set quotas for German 
students studying medicine in the country (by ECJ decision), without compensation either 
for how much they spent or the reduction of the number of doctors for Austria itself.    
 
More integration through new solidarity mechanisms has great advantages, especially if a 
EU mobility adjustment fund were accompanied not only by the oft-proposed EU 
unemployment fund but also by a European fund for refugee support.  Different countries 
would benefit at different times from the funds, which could be triggered when any one 
country finds itself overburdened by the extra costs it incurs because of the asymmetric 
functioning of the Single Market and the Single Currency, or because of its openness to 
refugees.  Different funding mechanisms are possible, including from member-state 
contributions, but the best would be from the EU’s own resources, based on monetary 
gains of the Single Market and Single Currency.  This could involve using a proportion of 
	 18	
VAT collected in trans-border transactions or of the Financial Transactions Tax.  Or even 
why not use ‘helicopter money’ from the ECB if possible?  And what of an EU 
‘solidarity tax’ levied on all citizens and residents of the EU, which would have the added 
advantage to build a sense of citizen-to-citizen solidarity. This, plus the financial and 
cross border transaction generated taxes, might ensure that no one could claim any longer 
that the EU was a ‘transfer union’ in which one or more member-states paid for the rest.42 
 
More generally, we need to emphasize the fact that to be sufficiently democratic and 
legitimate, a future soft core Europe would need to ensure that its many policy 
communities are governed in a manner that allows for as much decentralization and 
deconcentration of decision-making to the benefit of the member-states as possible.  But 
even this would not be enough to guarantee the ultimate effectiveness of EU governance, 
or its legitimacy in terms of results.   
 
Reforming the Institutional Rules 
For such differentiated integration to work, however, with all member-states feeling part 
of this soft core EU, whatever their level of involvement, they need to be full members of 
the EU institutions.  This means that all members should be able to exercise voice in all 
areas, but vote (in the Council and the EP) only in those areas in which they participate. 
Since all are members in the most significant policy community, the Single Market, this 
ensures that they will be voting a lot.  But for the Eurozone or Schengen, for example, 
only active members should be able to vote. For the Eurozone, this would mean 
envisioning that where some members in the future, say, pledge their own resources to a 
EU budget, their representatives would be the only ones to vote on the budget and its use, 
although everyone could discuss it (no separate Eurozone Parliament, then, but separate 
voting for members of a deeper budgetary union). For Schengen, this could mean that 
current Schengen participants that are not EU members, like Norway or Switzerland, 
would have voice and vote.  For these two countries, it could also mean that they could 
vote in the Single Market.  For the moment, they experience a major loss in democratic 
engagement, since they have to follow Single Market rules and regulations, as well as 
contribute to the EU budget, without the ability to exercise voice, let along vote. 
 
But to make EU governance truly workable, the institutional decision-making rules also 
require revision.  Among these, the unanimity rule for intergovernmental decision-
making needs to be abandoned.  The most sensible replacement would be one setting up 
‘constitutional’ treaties amendable by 2/3 or 4/5 majorities.  At the same time, many of 
the current treaty-based laws should become ordinary legislation, amendable by simple 
majority through the Community Method—as detailed by Dieter Grimm.43  Thus, for 
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example, while the Lisbon Treaty would remain a constitutional treaty, amendable 
however by 2/3 or 4/5 majorities, the various treaties involving the Eurozone, such as the 
Stability and Growth Pact or the Fiscal Compact, should become ordinary legislation—
much like the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack.  This means that they would be open to 
amendment through political debates and compromise, and subject to the Community 
Method of co-decision.  
 
In the case of new legislation, moreover, whether ordinary or constitutional, opt-outs for 
individual Member States should be allowed for exceptional reasons, such as where a 
member-state’s government, citizens, and/or parliament reject the initiative (e.g., the UK 
and Denmark on the Single Currency).  But as Fritz Scharpf has argued, any such opt-out 
could be subject to denial by qualified majorities, in cases where the opt-out would 
unfairly advantage the member-state and/or threaten the viability of the policy itself.44  
Alternative accommodations could then need to be made for the member-state in question. 
 
The knotty problem remains the question of politics and democracy.  Representative 
institutions need to be reinforced.  At the moment, the EU serves the purpose of the 
populists, by hollowing out national representative institutions, allowing the populists to 
claim that they are the true representatives of the people.  To change this, the EU needs to 
do more to reinforce citizen representation and participation.  For the Eurozone in 
particular, this at the very least demands more involvement of the European Parliament in 
decision-making, through a return to the Community Method.  Turning Eurozone treaties 
into ordinary legislation, morevoer, would help break the stalemate that makes it 
impossible to change such legislation (given the unanimity rule), and make them subject 
to political debate.  But the EP would also need to find more ways to bring national 
parliaments into EU level decision-making.  And the EU as a whole must devise new 





In sum, the future of EU governance is very open.  It is best conceived not as a hard core 
Europe centered around the Eurozone, let alone a future ‘superstate’, but as a region-state 
made up of a soft core of overlapping clusters of member-states in the EU’s many policy 
communities.  In this context, increasing flexibility in the EU’s legislative and policy 
processes, along with decentralization to the benefit of the member-states, would enhance 
policy effectiveness as well as democratic legitimacy.   
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Soft-core differentiation has certain common institutional requirements, including one set 
of laws overseen by the ECJ and ensured by national courts with one set of central 
institutions, including the Commission, Council and European Parliament.  That said, any 
number of specialized institutions may be established in a given policy community that 
deepens integration in that area, and is ‘made-to-purpose,’ just as in the Eurozone the 
ECB is in charge of monetary policy, the ESM of providing bail-out funds, with Banking 
Union having its own further set of institutions  
 
The danger for the EU, in particular in light of its many crises, is differentiated 
disintegration.  The best way to avoid this is planned differentiated integration, which 
means that the heterogeneity of EU member-states’ economies and polities is recognized 
as at the basis of European integration.  But this still leaves the question of how to 
construct a more democratically legitimate European Union.  My preliminary suggestion 
that deeper integration must at the same time allow for greater differentiation and 
decentralization.  For the Eurozone in particular, this would mean increasing 
decentralization of the European Semester to the benefit of national governments, 
parliaments, and civil society, with the governing rules and numbers treated more as 
guidelines in the emerging EU-wide system of budgetary coordination.  In this context, 
the consultative process at the national level would feed into EU level 
recommendations—as a bottom-up rather than top-down process—more in tune with the 
changing realities in national and EU economies and responsive to the diverse needs of 
European member-states’ heterogeneous economies.  Other still-to-be-deepened policy 
areas could follow suit, with general EU level guidelines allowing for greater 
differentiation among individual member-states or clusters of member-states. 
 
In short, re-envisioning the future of term EU in terms of a future soft core Europe makes 
the most sense.  To extend a metaphor I have previously evoked, the future cannot be a 
hard core Europe, with one set menu (prix fixe, pas de substitutions) for the chosen few.  
This is not to suggest, however, that the EU is now to be ‘Europe à la carte,’ where 
everyone orders different things.  Rather, this is an elaborate gourmet ‘menu Europe,’ 
with a shared main dish (the Single Market), all member-states sitting around the table 
and engaging in the conversation, and only some choosing to sit out one course or 
another.45  If we add graduated membership to this, we could imagine additional guests 
joining the diners at the table for particular courses and, slowly over time, partaking of 
more and more dishes even as they learn the manners of the table and the rules of the 
conversation.  Moreover, if we thought of moving forward in particular areas in terms of 
‘regional clusters’ of member-states in areas such as security, energy, and immigration,46 
the EU could promote innovative action without jeopardizing its overall cohesion. 
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